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Appealability of Refusals to Approve Proposed Title
VII Consent Decrees: Carson v. American Brands,
Inc.
Frank L. Carson brought a title VIII class action against his
employer and his union, alleging denial of equal job opportunities on the basis of race.2 After lengthy discovery 3 and class
certification, 4 all counsel negotiated a mutually satisfactory
consent decree 5 and tendered it for judicial approval. 6 The district court refused to approve the decree on the premise that it
granted preferential treatment on the basis of race in violation
1. Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
The named plaintiff requested relief "on behalf of black employees and black
persons who sought employment at [defendant's] Richmond, Virginia, leaf department." Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 606 F.2d 420, 425 (4th Cir. 1979)
(Winter, J., dissenting).
2. As well as allegedly violating title VII, the contested practices allegedly
violated section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976), and the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. See Brief for Appellants at 2, Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 606 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1979).
3. Discovery in the case, which lasted for over one year, "included the
taking of nineteen depositions and the analysis of boxes of written material
tendered in response to some of the six sets of interrogatories." 606 F.2d at 425
(Winter, J., dissenting).
4. Pursuant to rule 23(b) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
district court certified a class on March 1, 1977, that included all persons who
had applied for employment, or who had actually been employed, as seasonal
workers at American Brands on or after September 9, 1972. 606 F.2d at 425-26
(Winter, J., dissenting).
5. The five substantive provisions of the proposed consent decree are
found in the dissenting opinion. These provisions allow: (1) seniority credit for
seasonal employment; (2) elimination of an extra probationary period "to become eligible for medical and sick benefits" for "[r]egular employees who
[h] ad successfully served a probationary period as seasonal employees;" (3) an
opportunity for seasonal employees to bid for regular production jobs before
outside hiring (4) an opportunity for seasonal employees "to bid on vacancies
in the watchman job classification" before outside hiring; and (5) a goal of making the supervisory force one-third black by December 31, 1980. 606 F.2d at 427
(Winter, J., dissenting).
6. All class action consent decrees must be tendered for judicial approval.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e). The rule is designed both to minimize the possibility of
strike suits and to ensure that the interests of absent class members are adequately protected. See Norman v. McKee, 431 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 912 (1970); Yaffe v. Detroit Steel Corp., 50 F.R.D. 481, 483 (N.D. Ill.
1970). See also 3b MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.80 [2.-l] (2d ed. 1979); 3 H.
NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS 402-03 (1977); Dole, The Settlement of
Class Actions For Damages, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 971, 975 (1971).
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of title VII.7 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit refused to review this determination, holding that a district court
order refusing entry of a proposed title VII class action consent
decree is not appealable. Carson v. American Brands,Inc., 606
F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1979).
The appealability of district court orders is circumscribed
by section 1291 of the Judicial Code, which states: "The courts
of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts
"....
8 The main rationale for restricting appeals to "final" orders 9 is the enhancement of
judicial efficiency'O through avoidance of time-consuming
piecemeal appeals" and through consolidation of potential errors.12 Various factors, however, militate against rigid adher7. Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 446 F. Supp. 780, 790-91 (E.D. Va.
1977), appealdismissed, 606 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1979). See Reply Brief for Appellants at 5, Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 606 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1979).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976).
9. Traditionally, a final order is "one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." Catlin v.
United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945). The line of demarcation between appealability and finality, however, is by no means clear. As early as 1892 the court
observed: "Probably no question of equity practice has been the subject of
more frequent discussion in this court than the finality of decrees .... The
cases, it must be conceded, are not altogether harmonious." McGourkey v. Toledo & 0. Cent. Ry., 146 U.S. 536, 544-45 (1892). Recently, the Court reiterated
this point: "No verbal formula yet devised can explain prior finality decisions
with unerring accuracy or provide an utterly reliable guide for the future." Elsen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974) (citing McGourkey v. Toledo
& 0. Cent. Ry., 146 U.S. 536, 544-45 (1892)). See also Dickenson v. Petroleum
Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950).
10. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 473 (1978); Catlin v. United
States, 324 U.S. 229, 234 (1945). For a more detailed discussion of the justifications for the rule, see generally C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 3907, at 429-35 (1976); Note, Interlocutory Appeal

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1) of Orders Denying Class Action Certification, 58
B.U.L. REV. 61, 62 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Boston Note]; Note, Toward A
More Rational Final Judgment Rule: A Proposalto Amend 28 U.S.C. § 1292, 67
GEO. L.J 1025, 1025-26 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Georgetown Note]; Note, Appealabilityin the Federal Courts, 75 HARv. L. REv. 351, 351-52 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Harvard Note].
11. See, e.g., Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 471 (1978). Apart
from an annoying trial interruption, a lengthy delay may require the trial court
to spend additional time refamiliarizing itself with the case and conceivably
may require the trial to start new. See Harvard Note, supra note 10, at 351-52.
12. Not only will all of the relevant errors be consolidated, but many alleged errors will no longer be significant. For example, the parties may settle,
the party prejudiced by the error may emerge victorious, or the trial judge may
reverse his decision. C. WRiGHT,A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 10, § 3907,
at 431.
Other arguments in support of a narrow appealability rule include: the
danger that a wealthy party could harass another litigant through repeated interlocutory appeals of subsidiary issues, see Cobbledick v. United States, 309
U.S. 323, 325 (1940); C. WRIGT,A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 10, § 3907, at
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ence to a strict finality rule.13 Unless some interlocutory orders
are immediately appealable, litigants may undergo irreparable
harm 14 or may be compelled to conduct an unnecessary and expensive trial.1 5 The finality rule would actually cause judicial
inefficiency if the savings in appellate resources from refusals
to review are outweighed by the waste of trial court resources
in continuing to a final decision.' 6 Recognition of these counand jutervailing considerations has resulted in both statutory
7
dicial exceptions to the section 1291 "finality" rule.'
One such judicial exception was set forth in Cohen v. Bene432; the possible diminished respect for a trial judge's decisions if a barrage of
appeals takes place, see Georgetown Note, supra note 10, at 1025 n.7; Harvard
Note, supra note 10, at 352; the likelihood that ready availability of immediate
appeal from a trial judge's decisions will reduce his ability to control the litigation, see Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 606 F.2d at 424-25; and finally, the belief that appellate court decisions are made more accurate by reviewing alleged
errors with a complete record, see id. at 422.
13. See generally C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 10, § 3907,
at 433; Boston Note, supra note 10, at 62-63; Georgetown Note, supra note 10, at
1026 n.16; Harvard Note, supra note 10, at 353.
14. This is readily apparent in a request for a preliminary injunction on
the ground of pending irreparable harm. A strict application of the final judgment rule would postpone appeal of a denial of a preliminary injunction until
after a determination on the permanent injunction. If the former derermination was in error, it would be impossible to mitigate the harm. See Boston
Note, supra note 10, at 62.
15. A reversal of an interlocutory order may dispose of the litigation and
obviate the need for futher lower court proceedings. See Harvard Note, supra
note 10, at 352.
16. The Supreme Court recognized this in Gillespie v. United States Steel
Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964), when it said: "[N]ow that the case is before is before
us... the eventual costs,. . . will certainly be less if we now pass on the questions presented here rather than send the case back with those issues undemight work a great
cided. Moreover, delay of perhaps a number of years ...
Id. at 153. This consideration should only be applied when the
injustice ......
savings in resources are substantial. The Supreme Court recently refused to
apply Gillespie in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978), in which it
stated, "If Gillespie were extended beyond the unique facts of that case, § 1291
would be stripped of all significance." Id. at 477 n.30.
17. Only the "collateral" order exception to section 1291, see notes 18-20 infra and accompanying text, and the statutory exception of section 1292(a) (1),
see notes 23-28 infra and accompanying text, are relevant to the appealability
of a refusal to enter a consent decree. Other exceptions relevant to some interlocutory orders but beyond the scope of this Comment include: rule 54(b) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, allowing final judgments to be entered
with respect to less than all of the claims or parties; the Forgay-Conradexception, involving orders to deliver property; the "death knell" doctrine, allowing
case certification appeal if it is likely that the individual plaintiff cannot pursue
the lawsuit, which was rejected by the Supreme Court in Coopers & Lybrand v.
Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 477 (1978); section 1292(b) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b) (1976), allowing certification of appeals of substantial issues of law;
and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1976), authorizing writ of mandamus.
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ficial Industrial Loan Corp.,18 in which the Court held that
"collateral orders" may be appealed even though they are not
technically "final decisions."' 9 The exception requires that the
order (1) not be tentative, informal, or incomplete; (2) be collateral to and separate from the merits; and (3) be effectively
unreviewable-the asserted right will be "lost, probably irreparably" if review is delayed.20 Many of these original criteria
have been inconsistently applied as lower courts have expanded the Cohen exception.2 ' Despite this occasionally inconsistent application, the Court reaffirmed the validity of those
22
criteria in a recent decision, Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay.
18. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
19. The Court held that an order requiring the stockholder-plaintiff to comply with a state statute that compelled the posting of bond was appealable pursuant to section 1291.
This decision appears to fall in that small class which finally determines claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted
in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of
the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated. The Court has long given this provision of the statute this practical rather than a technical construction.
Id. at 546.
20. Id. Some commentators derive a fourth requirement from the Cohen
opinion-the order must involve a serious and unsettled question of public importance. See C. WRIGHT,A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 10, § 3911, at 47071; Note, The Appealability of Orders Denying Motionsfor Disqualificationof
Counsel in the Federal Courts, 24 U. CHL L. REV. 450, 454-55 (1978); Case Comment, Immediate Appealability of Orders Denying Class Certification: Coopers
& Lybrand v. Livesay and Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 40 OHIO
ST. L.J. 441, 452 (1979). This fourth requirement has always been arguable, at
best, and recently was discarded by the Court. See United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 855 (1978); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 658 (1977).
21. See C. WIGHT,A. MMLER & E. COOPER, supra note 10, § 3911, at 472-86;
Case Comment, supra note 20, at 450-51.
22. 437 U.S. 463 (1978). See Recent Developments, Appealability ofDistrict
Court Orders Disapproving Proposed Settlements in Shareholder Derivative
Suits, 32 VAND.L. REV. 985, 991 (1979). The Court stated that "the order must
conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and be effectively unreviewable
on appeal from a final judgment." 437 U.S. at 468. One commentator argued that
Justice Stevens enunciated a conjunctive test (by using "and") and used "completely separate" to imply a stricter threshold. The commentator concluded
that the test had been "reformulated." See Recent Developments, supra, at 991.
It is clear, however, that the test has always been conjunctive-all three requirements must be met. All pretrial orders in response to motions "conclusively determine the disputed question" and would be appealable if the test
were disjunctive. Moreover, Justice Stevens' use of "completely separate" to refer to a collateral order is by no means dispositive. Not only does he cite the
original Cohen language in the accompanying footnote, see Coopers & Lybrand
v. Livesay, 437 U.S. at 468 n.10 (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337
U.S. 541, 546 (1949)), he also borrows the language of Mercantile Nat'l Bank v.
Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555 (1963), which simply states that an order cannot be "enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff's cause of action." Id. at 558. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. at 469.
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In addition to Cohen, section 1292(a) (1) also provides an
exception to the section 1291 finality rule, by authorizing courts
of appeal to review "[i] nterlocutory orders of the district courts
... granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving in23
Aljunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions."
though it is clear that not all orders labeled "injunctions" are
automatically appealable, 24 it is unclear whether the order
must actually include words of restraint or direction to be appealable under section 1292(a) (1).25 One widespread interpretation is that the language applies to orders that have the
'26
substantial effect of a "grant or refusal of an injunction.
27
This pragmatic test, often interpreted inconsistently, is best
applied by weighing the major policy considerations behind the
finality rule and the "injunction" exception 2 8 -especially the
possibility that irreparable harm may occur if appeal is not
available.
In recent years, title VII class action suits have proliferated.29 Nevertheless, until Carson, there were no reported
cases discussing the appealability of a refusal to approve a proposed title VII consent decree. Some guidance, however, can
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1976).
24. See, e.g., International Prod. Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403, 406 (2d Cir.
1963) ("[T]he mere presence of words of restraint or direction in an order that
is only a step in an action does not make § 1292(a) (1) applicable.") (citations
omitted). See also C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 10, § 2962, at
614.
25. See Note, The Finality and Appealability of Interlocutory Orders-A
StructuralReform Toward Redefinition, 7 SuFFoLK U.L. REv. 1037, 1052 (1973).
26. In Ettleson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 317 U.S. 188 (1942), the Court
stated: "The relief afforded by section 129 [the predecessor of section
1292(a) (1) ] is not restricted by the terminology used. The statute looks to the
substantial effect of the order made." Id. at 192 (citations omitted). See also
Jordon v. School Dist., 548 F.2d 117, 119 n.5 (3d Cir. 1977); C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER
& E. COOPER, supra note 10, § 2962, at 615.
27. This test caused one commentator to observe that "ingenious counsel
have found injunctions lurking in virtually every ruling that a district court can
be called upon to make." 9 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 110.20[1], at 233 (2d
ed. 1980). Such attorney tenacity and resultant judicial inconsistency renders it
difficult to reconcile the case law. See Note, supra note 25, at 1051-52 n.70.
28. See notes 9-19 supra and accompanying text. See also notes 87-98 infra.
29. A trend in recent Supreme Court decisions, however, may eventually
reduce the popularity of class action title VII suits. See, e.g., Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 437 U.S. 478 (1978) (denial of class certification not
appealable); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (denial of disability insurance for pregnancy not sex discrimination); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (individual notice to class members required if possible
with reasonable effort); Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973)
(each class member must satisfy jurisdictional amount independently). See
generally Boston Note, supra note 10, at 73-79.
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be gleaned from the cases discussing the appealability of trial
court refusals to approve settlements in shareholder derivative
suits.30 These cases have reached inconsistent results. The
Ninth Circuit, for example, in Norman v. McKee3l held an order
denying approval of a proposed shareholder derivative settlement to be appealable under the collateral order doctrine. The
court concluded that the order was not tentative and was collateral and independent from the merits because it was not a step
toward final disposition and it did not merge in the final judg30. Prior to 1966, approval of both class action settlements and derivative
suits were governed by the same provision-rule 23(c) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. See C. WIGHT,A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 10, § 1811,
at 300. In 1966, however, the statute was amended so that class action settlements were governed by rule 23(e), and derivative suits were governed by rule
231. The rationale for this change was that, although most derivative actions
qualified as class actions, the number of shareholders in some derivative suits
was insufficient to justify a class action. Consequently, it was decided that
shareholder derivative suits should be dealt with in a separate rule. Id. The
amendment thus did not alter the underlying rationale for requiring judicial approval, see note 6 supra, and the standards used to evaluate proposed derivative and class action settlements are to some extent interchangeable. See
Shensky v. Dorsey, 574 F.2d 131, 147 (3d Cir. 1978). Compare In re Pittsburgh
and LE. R.R. Securities & Antitrust Litigation, 543 F.2d 1058, 1070 (3d Cir. 1976)
with Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 156-57 (3d Cir. 1975). See also 3 H. NEWBURG,
supra note 6, at 402; C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 10, § 1839,
at 427.
The degrees of scrutiny applicable to proposed class or shareholder derivative settlements, however, are significantly different. Although a strong congressional policy encourages class action settlements and, to an even greater
degree, title VII settlements, no such policy is present in shareholder disputes.
Judicial review of refusals to approve proposed settlements should therefore be
more readily available in title VII class actions. See notes 97-98 infra and accompanying text. Moreover, since title VII consent decrees include prospective
relief, and shareholder derivative suits merely seek conpensatory relief, the
policy considerations affecting appealability are substantially different. See
notes 63-64 infra and accompanying text.
31. 431 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 912 (1970). Other federal courts have supported the Norman result without proffering rationales.
For example, in In re International House of Pancakes Franchise Litigation, 487
F.2d 303 (8th Cir. 1973), the Eighth Circuit reviewed, without questioning its authority to do so, a refusal to approve a proposed settlement agreement. But see
Roach v. Churchman, 457 F.2d 1101 (8th Cir. 1972). Typically, these other federal courts enunciate a standard of review applicable to "approval or disapproval" of proposed settlements. See United Founders Life Ins. Co. v.
Consumers Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 447 F.2d 647, 655 (7th Cir. 1971) (emphasis added). See also Young v. Katz, 447 F.2d 431, 433 (5th Cir. 1971).
A recent Pennsylvania case concurred with the Norman result. See
Buchanan v. Century Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 393 A.2d 704 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978)
(class action of mortgage borrowers against lending institutions). The court,
acknowledging that it was not compelled to follow federal precedent, explicitly
stated that it would follow the Norman rule because it found it persuasive. Id.
at 709 n.13.
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ment.32 Mootness would preclude review of the order following
judgment. 33 Even assuming that the decision was reviewable
at that time, courts following the Ninth Circuit approach note
that it would be virtually impossible to frame a remedy for an
abuse of discretion because the uncertainty that was present at
34
the time of a compromise is gone.
An alternate rationale used by these courts is that the savings in trial court resources resulting from immediate review
outweigh the expenditure of appellate resources. 35 The Norman court noted that "stockholder's derivative suits and class
actions generally present complex questions" that engender
lengthy and expensive trials.36 Consequently, erroneous refusals to approve settlements in such cases would waste trial court
and litigant resources to a much greater extent than usual. The
court added that this could infringe on the class members' right
to fair representation. 3 7
Other courts have reached opposite results, holding that refusals to approve settlements are not appealable. 38 The orders
were not thought to be "collateral" because they were based, in
part, on an assessment of the merits of the parties' positions,
and were not a deviation from the main path of litigation; indeed, they were a step on the path leading to final judgment. 39
32. 431 F.2d at 773. Accord, Buchanan v. Century Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n,
393 A.2d 704, 707 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978).
33. Buchanan v. Century Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 393 A.2d 704, 707 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1978).
34. Id. The fairness balancing test used to review the proposed settlement
is predicated on the existence of incomplete facts. See generally Norman v.
McKee, 431 F.2d at 773-74. It is impossible, in an after-the-fact review with full
knowledge of what happened at trial, to feign a state of mind of incomplete
knowledge.
35. See, e.g., Norman v. McKee, 431 F.2d at 773 (relying on the standard of
Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964)) cert. denied, 401 U.S.
912 (1970). See also note 16 supra and accompanying text.
36. Norman v. McKee, 431 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir.) (emphasis added), cert
denied, 401 U.S. 912 (1970).
37. Id.
38. Seigal v. Merrick, 590 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1978) (stockholder derivative settlement); Roach v. Churchman, 457 F.2d 1101 (8th Cir. 1972) (airplane accident
class action settlement agreement).
In United States v. American Inst. of Real Estate Appraisers of the Nat'l
Ass'n of Realtors, 590 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1978), the Seventh Circuit held that an
order approving a proposed settlement was not appealable. Id. at 245. The
opinion in Appraisers may be distinguished from Seigal and Roach on the basis of the unique procedural posture. The parties seeking review in Appraisers
were permissive interveners challenging the approval of the proposed settlement. Arguably, this restricted intervention altered the policy considerations.
39. Seigal v. Merrick, 590 F.2d 35, 37-38 (2d Cir. 1978). (The order simply
permitted "the parties to proceed with the litigation or to propose a different
settlement." Id. at 37.) In Roach v. Churchman, 457 F.2d 1101 (8th Cir. 1972),
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Since an approval of a compromise becomes a final judgment, a
refusal to approve is arguably equivalent to the denial of sum41
mary judgment 4O-an order that is clearly not appealable.
Moreover, several courts have argued that the decree can still
be reviewed following a trial on the merits. 42 One of these
courts has also rejected section 1292(a) (1) as a basis for appeal,
finding that a refusal to approve a settlement has neither the
form nor effect of an injunction.43
In Carson v. American Brands, Inc.,44 the Fourth Circuit
held that a district court order refusing entry of a proposed title
VII class action consent decree is not appealable. The court
reasoned that although a district court's entry of a consent decree would terminate the action and would therefore be final, a
refusal to enter a decree is only interlocutory. 45 The court focused solely on the inapplicability of the statutory exception to
section 1291-section 1292(a) (1).46 While conceding that the
consent decree contained injunctive relief,47 the court concentrated on the element of "irreparable harm."48 No "irreparable"
the court, without mentioning Norman, found that the order was not "collateral" because it "directly relates to the conduct of the defense in the main action. The granting of appellant's motion for a consent judgment would have
resulted in a final disposition of the main action, not a disposition of a right
'separable' from the merits." Id. at 1104. Although the Seventh Circuit held
nonappealable an order approving a proposed settlement, the court nevertheless conceded that the order was unrelated to the merits. United States v.
American Inst. of Real Estate Appraisers of the Natl Ass'n of Realtors, 590 F.2d
242, 245 (7th Cir. 1978).
40. Seigal v. Merrick, 590 F.2d 35, 38 (2d Cir. 1978).
41. See Switzerland Cheese Ass'n, Inc. v. E. Home's Mkt., Inc., 385 U.S. 23,
25 (1966). See also text accompanying notes 71-74 infra.
42. Roach v. Churchman, 457 F.2d 1101, 1104 (8th Cir. 1972). Cf. United
States v. American Inst. of Real Estate Appraisers of the Nat'l Ass'n of Realtors, 590 F.2d 242, 245 (7th Cir. 1978) (stating that an order approving a proposed settlement can be reviewed after trial). One court, however, admitted,
"In only one sense, of course, is the refusal to approve a proposed settlement
final, for that particular settlement will never be revived." Seigal v. Merrick,
590 F.2d 35, 38 (2d Cir. 1978) (emphasis in original).
43. See Roach v. Churchman, 457 F.2d 1101, 1104-05 (8th Cir. 1972). Cf.
United States v. American Inst. of Real Estate Appraisers of the Nat'l Ass'n of
Realtors, 590 F.2d 242, 244-45 (7th Cir. 1978) (finding that an order approving a
proposed settlement had neither the form nor effect of an injunction). In Seigal v. Merrick, 590 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1978), the court never addressed the issue of
whether the denial of a settlement was a denial of an injunction.
44. 606 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1979).
45. Id. at 422.
46. Id. at 421. The Carson court's failure to examine the Cohen collateral
order doctrine is especially surprising in light of the court's heavy reliance on
Seigal v. Merrick, 590 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1978), a collateral order case. See 606 F.2d
423-24.
47. 606 F.2d at 423.
48. Irreparable harm is a key factor in determining whether an order is an
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effect was found because "no right is forfeited as a result of
delayed review. Here, injunctive relief was not finally denied; it
was merely not granted at this stage in the proceedings." 49 The
court analogized the denial of a consent decree to the denial of
a motion for summary judgment asking for injunctive relief.
Denial decided "only one thing-that the case should go to
trial."5 0 The court concluded by reviewing pragmatic reasons
for not allowing appeals from consent decrees: the two-year delay already caused by the appeal, the potential for "an endless
string of appeals," the difficult burden of demonstrating an
abuse of discretion by the trial court, the potential for a district
court to reconsider its initial refusal, and the enhanced ability
of the district court to supervise the litigation if all decrees are
reviewed after final judgment.5 1 Furthermore, the court implied that any harm from its refusal to approve consent decrees
would be minimized because it could review all proposed con2
sent decrees after final judgment.
The Carson court largely ignored a potentially dispositive
54
53
approach to the issue of appealability -the Cohen doctrine.
The district court's refusal to approve the title VII consent decree may have been reviewable as a "collateral order."5 5 Since
the Ninth Circuit has applied the "collateral order" doctrine to
injunction. See text accompanying notes 14, 28 supra;notes 68-79 infra and accompanying text.
49. 606 F.2d at 423.
50. Id. (quoting Switzerland Cheese Ass'n, Inc. v. E. Home's Mkt., Inc., 385
U.S. 23, 25 (1966)).
51. 606 F.2d at 424-25. In addition to these specific factors, the court noted
that appeals of right from interlocutory trial court decisions are generally disfavored because "[t]hey disrupt the trial process, slow the course of litigation
and create unnecessary multiple appeals. A single appeal following final judgment facilitates orderly litigation and comprehensive appellate review of all issues presented ... ." Id. at 422. Later, the court added that nonappealability
enhances the district court's control over the litigation. Id. at 423.
52. See id. at 424-25.
53. Although the court mentioned the "collateral order" doctrine, it did not
discuss the doctrine. This omission might be due to the failure of the parties to
brief the appealability issue. They all assumed appealability, leaving the question whether the district court judge had abused his discretion as the only issue. See Brief for Appellants, Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 606 F.2d 420
(4th Cir. 1979); Joint Brief for Defendants-Appellees; Reply Brief for Appellants.
54. See notes 18-22 supra and accompanying text.
55. A persuasive argument can be made that the order was appealable
under the "collateral order" doctrine. The first Cohen requirement, that the order not be tentative, informal, or incomplete, was clearly met. This Cohen element is satisfied if "no further consideration is contemplated." C. WIGIHr, A.
MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 10, § 3911, at 470. See also Case Comment,
supra note 20, at 451. The district court issued an opinion stating the reasons
for denial of approval. 446 F. Supp. 780 (E.D. Va. 1977), appeal dismissed, 606
F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1979). The probability that the judge would reconsider his decision was sufficiently small to render the opinion a final order.
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refusals to enter proposed settlements,5 6 the Fourth Circuit
should have at least acknowledged the possible applicability of
the doctrine.
In addition to omitting any consideration of the Cohen doctrine, the court also failed to satisfactorily discuss section
1292 (a) (1). The applicability of the "injunction" exception to
the denial of title VII consent decrees requires reexamination
of the case in light of the differences between title VII consent
decrees and shareholder derivative settlements. The three
most important factors governing the applicability of section
1292(a) (1) are: (1) whether the order has the substantial effect
of an injunction; (2) whether irreparable harm would result;
and (3) the effect of applying the competing policy consideraThe second requirement, that the order be sufficiently separable from, but
collateral to, the merits, is the crux of the Cohen appealability standard. In National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977), the
Supreme Court held that a state court's refusal to stay an injunction was a final
judgment, "since it involved a right 'separable from, and collateral' to the merits." Id. at 44 (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)).
The injunction enjoined the petitioners from conducting a march. The Court
explained that the refusal to stay the injunction 'Tinally determined the merits
of petitioners' claim that the outstanding injunction will deprive them of rights
protected by the First Amendment during the period of appellate review." 432
U.S. at 44. In effect, the Court treated the petitioners' demand to be allowed to
march pending appeal as separate from their ultimate right to conduct marches
at any time. The Carson court's refusal to approve a settlement is even more
collateral to the issues at trial because the major concern is whether the settlement would be fair and not whether anyone has legally violated title VII. See
C. WIGHr, A. MILLER & E. CooPER, supra note 10, § 3911, at 470-71 ("so long as
the matter is so collateral that it need not entail consideration of the merits, it
may be reviewed immediately with no greater cost in appellate time than if review were postponed"). See also Cohen, "Not Dead But Only Sleeping'" The
Rejection of the Death Knell Doctrine and the Survival of Class Actions Denied
Certification,59 B.U. L. REv. 257, 265-66 (1979).
A finding of collaterality would also be consonant with the underlying finality justification of judicial efficiency. The optimal moment for judicial review of
a refusal to approve a settlement is immediately after the refusal because one
of the factors to be considered in assessing fairness is the likely outcome if the
matter went to trial; post-trial review of abuse of discretion is likely to be heavily colored by the actual outcome at trial.
The third factor is whether the order would be essentially unreviewable
after final judgment. The instant order is unreviewable not only because it will
be rendered moot by any trial result, but also beause proposed settlements invariably contain a provision that nullifies the legal significance of the proposal
upon its disapproval. See note 83 infra and accompanying text. Moreover, even
assuming that review were possible, it would be difficult to frame the appropriate remedy since there is no longer any uncertainty as to the outcome at trial.
See notes 85-86 infra; note 34 supra and accompanying text.
56. See notes 31-33 supra and accompanying text. But cf. notes 39-41 supra
and accompanying text (discussing cases which have held that orders refusing
to approve settlements are not collateral).
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Clearly, the mere labeling of an order as an "injunction"
will not render it appealable.5 8 Instead, the initial determination is whether the order has the "substantial effect" of an injunction.5 9 Critical to a "substantial effect" determination is
whether the order restricts future conduct and does not compensate past harm.6 0 This explains why refusals to approve
shareholder derivative suit settlements have not been found to
be "denials of injunctions." 61 The object of a shareholder derivative action is usually to ascertain the proper distribution of
money or stocks, and the action rarely encompasses an injunction of future conduct. Similarly, many other types of class actions that seek only compensation fail to have the "substantial"
effect of an injunction. 62 Title VII class actions, however, are
clearly distinguishable. Pursuant to section 2000e-5(g), 63 three
basic types of relief are available: "(1) Proscriptive-stopping
the old unfair system or practices, (2) Corrective--creating a
new system or set of practices that will be fair, and (3) Compensatory-adjusting for past wrongs." 64 Proscriptive, 65 correc57. See text accompanying notes 26-28 supra.
58. See note 24 supra and accompanying text. Curiously, all the parties,
the dissent, and even the majority, refer to the proposed consent decree in Carson as an injunction. 606 F.2d at 423, 428-29 (Winter, J., dissenting).
59. See note 26 supra and accompanying text. Even though the court in
Roach v. Churchman, 457 F.2d 1101 (8th Cir. 1972), noted the trial court's failure
to "cast its order in the form of any injunction," id. at 1104, it is clear that the
majority of circuits hold an order with the "substantial effect" of an injunction
to be sufficient, irrespective of the label that the order is given. Note, The Limits of Section 1292(A) (1) Redefined?: Appealability of the Class Determination
as an Order "Refusing an Injunction," 9 U. TOr- L REV. 488, 496, 500(1978)
[hereinafter cited as Toledo Note]. See also Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 317 U.S. 188, 192 (1942); Boston Note, supra note 10, at 71.
60. See Boston Note, supra note 10, at 71.
61. See generally note 43 supra and accompanying text. The prospective
nature of title VII consent decrees differs from a refusal to certify a class. See,
e.g., Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 437 U.S. 478 (1978). Certification of a class (or denial of such certification) does not compel future action or
inaction.
62. For example, in Roach v. Churchman, 457 F.2d 1101 (8th Cir. 1972), in
which section 1292(a) (1) was found inapplicable, the class sought wrongful
death damages arising out of an airplane crash. Regulation of future conduct
was not sought.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).

64. G. COOPER, H. RABE & H. RuBIn, FAIR EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION: TExT
AND MATERIALS FOR STUDENT AND PRACTITIONER 430 (1975). Most title VII consent decrees include a broad proscriptive order enjoining future illegal discrimination. Such a provision permits the court to hold in contempt a party who
persists in a violation. Moreover, decrees can enjoin retaliatory action. See
Note, Title VII Consent Decrees: Affirmative Inaction?,18 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
517, 521 (1978).
65. Title VII consent decrees include proscriptive relief. See Note, supra
note 64, at 521.
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tive, and, in some cases, 66 compensatory relief all compel either
future action or inaction and would thus have the substantial
67
effect of an injunction.
Since the requested relief in title VII consent decrees satisfies the definitional requirement of an injunction, the second element of section 1292(a) (1), the likelihood that irreparable
harm would be caused by unappealability, must be examined.6 8
Central to this consideration are the degree to which the appealed order affects or disposes of the merits and the extent to
which the order would be reviewable after final judgment. 69
The meaning of the "affecting the merits" standard is somewhat uncertain,7 0 but it apparently means that the appealed or66. If compensatory relief consisted only of reimbursement of back pay, it
would not resemble an injunction. If an ongoing scheme is constructed to remedy past discrimination, however, such relief may have the substantial effect of
an injunction.
67. See Boston Note, supra note 10, at 71. In Lewis v. Tobacco Workers'
Int'l Union, 577 F.2d 1135 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1089 (1979), the
Fourth Circuit held that a district court order requiring the defendant to comply with a number of plaintiffs' requests for relief was appealable. The circuit
court stated that "the guidelines, requiring the defendants to act in some instances and forbidding them to act in others, [constitute] an injunction." 577
F.2d at 1139. The dissent in Carson aptly noted that "the proposed consent decree is equally appealable, because § 1292(a) (1) authorizes an appeal from an
interloctory order 'refusing' an injunction." 606 F.2d at 429 (Winter, J., dissenting). Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has held injunctive provisions of a consent decree to be appealable pursuant to § 1292(a) (1). Myers v. Gilman Paper Corp.,
544 F.2d 837, 847 (5th Cir. 1977).
68. In Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 437 U.S. 478 (1978), the
Court stated that the exception was keyed to the "need to permit litigants to
effectually challenge interlocutory orders of serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence." Id. at 480 (quoting Baltimore Contractors v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176,

181 (1955)).
69. 437 U.S. at 480-81 & nn.6-7.
70. Arguably, an order either affects the merits or it does not affect the
merits. If it does, it should be analyzed pursuant to section 1292(a) (1). If it
does not, it is collateral and arguably appealable under section 1291. See note
55 supra and accompanying text. This dichotomy, however, is not dispositive.
For example, in Gardner,a section 1292(a) (1) case, the Court said that an order denying class certification "did not affect the merits of petitioner's own
claim." Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 437 U.S. 478, 480-81 (1978).
In Coopers & Lybrand, a collateral order case, the Court stated that an order
denying class certification "generally involves considerations that are 'enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiffs cause of action."' Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 479 (1978) (quoting
Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 558 (1963)). Consequently, the
same type of order was held nonappealable in both cases and was "enmeshed
in the merits," yet did not affect the merits. Apparently, assuming that the
Court is not blatantly inconsistent, an order can sufficiently involve the merits
so that the Cohen collateral doctrine is not fulfilled, yet also be sufficiently separate from the merits so that § 1292(a) (1) is rendered inapplicable. This middle
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der causes a party to lose a portion of the solution he seeks.
In examining the requirement of "affecting the merits," the
Carson court compared the refusal to approve a title VII settlement to the denial of a motion for summary judgment,7 1 which
the Supreme Court has held to be nonappealable as a final order.72 The Fourth Circuit considered the two to be analogous
because the denial of either did not decide the merits, and the
only thing decided was "that the case should go to trial."73
Consent decrees and summary judgment, however, are distinguishable. The refusal to approve a proposed settlement is effectively a final decision 74 that the remedy chosen by the
parties is unacceptable. The denial of a motion for summary
judgment, however, is the court's decision on the necessity for
trial without regard to the relief ultimately granted. The two
may also be distinguished for reasons of judicial efficiency.
Fear of floodgate appeals is an important consideration in the
case of summary judgment motions because of the pervasive
use of such motions. They are truly "pretrial orders" that are
routinely requested. On the other hand, getting two adverse
parties to agree to submit a consent decree is not a routine pretrial practice. Furthermore, since the vast majority of submitted consent decrees are approved and since it is common for
courts to deny motions for summary judgment, the danger of
burdening the courts is less with the former. Finally, the refusal to approve proposed title VII consent decrees is similar to
the denial of a preliminary injunction. Although the language
ground dispells the theory of a rigid bifurcation. Instead of focusing on semantics, it is more important to probe the underlying justifications for requiring either "collateralness" or "affecting the merits."
For the most part, those shareholder derivative cases that considered nonappealable a refusal to approve a settlement concluded that the order affected
the merits, see, e.g., Seigal v. Merick, 590 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1978), and those
cases that considered the refusal to be appealable held that it was collateral,
see, e.g., Norman v. McKee, 431 F.2d 769, 773 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 912
(1970); Buchanan v. Century Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 393 A.2d 704, 707 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1978). One court, however, found the collateral order doctrine to be
inapplicable despite the court's belief that the issuance of a consent decree was
unrelated to the merits. See United States v. American Inst. of Real Estate Appraisers of the Nat'l Ass'n of Realtors , 590 F.2d 242, 245 (7th Cir. 1978) (order
approving a proposed settlement held nonappealable). See also notes 38-39
supra and accompanying text.
71. 606 F.2d at 423.
72. Switzerland Cheese Ass'n, Inc. v. E. Home's Mkt., Inc., 385 U.S. 23
(1966).
73. 606 F.2d at 423 (quoting Switzerland Cheese Ass'n, Inc. v. E. Home's
Mkt., Inc., 385 U.S. 23, 25 (1966)).
74. See notes 80-85 infra and accompanying text.
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of section 1292(a) (1) refers to injunctions in general,7 5 the legislative history of the provision suggests that the exception for
injunctions was created primarily to permit appeal from denials of preliminary injunctions. 7 6 The harm that a plaintiff suffers when his request for a consent decree is denied would be
similar to that suffered by a plaintiff whose request for a preliminary injunction is denied;77 he may suffer a period of continuing discrimination and be harmed because of the delay in
acquiring relief.78 If the parties are forced to go to trial because
of a denied settlement, the benefits that the consent decree
would have conferred-for example, reassurance of a better job
and enhanced job security 79-would be lost, at least until final
75. The statute merely addresses the grant, continuation, modification, refusal, or dissolution of "injunctions." 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1) (1976).
76. See Stewart-Warner Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 325 F.2d 822,
829-30 (2d Cir. 1963) (Friendly, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 944 (1964);
Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1072 (1965); Toledo Note, supra note 59, at 492-95. Of course, the statute is not necessarily restricted to preliminary injunctions even though a denial of immediate appeal
from a preliminary injunction is more likely to result in irreparable harm. Id.
at 519.
77. Regardless of whether the consent decree actually contains preliminary injunction wording, such wording is implicit. Title VII consent decrees
call for an immediate end to ongoing discrimination. Moreover, under the "advance denial" theory, an order refusing a permanent injunction may amount to
an "advance denial" of a preliminary injunction motion. If the court decides
that no injunctive relief should be granted, since the "greater includes the
less," no preliminary relief will be granted. See Toledo Note, supra note 59, at
494-95, and cases cited therein. The instant case highlights such an "advance
denial." The district court rejected the proposed consent decree on the premise that any preferential treatment on the basis of race transgresses both title
VII and the Constitution. Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 446 F. Supp. 780, 778
(E.D. Va. 1977), appeal dismissed, 606 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1979). Clearly no preliminary relief would have been forthcoming. This "advance denial" argument
would only be applicable to similar denials of relief as a matter of law.
78. See Boston Note, supra note 10, at 71; Toledo Note, supra note 59, at
494, 518.
79. Professor Richards suggests that psychological injury, whether humiliation and embarrassment or more serious harm, is arguably "irreparable
harm." Richards, PreliminaryRelief in Employment DiscriminationCases, 66
Ky. L.J. 39, 48 (1977). Professor Richards suggests three reasons why plaintiffs
seek preliminary relief:
First, such relief will frequently accord more complete relief than will
final relief. Depending upon the circumstances, preliminary relief may
prevent loss of income during the period of litigation; lessen or avert
the humiliation and mental distress which may result from discrimination; reduce or eliminate problems of proving injuries and losses; provide an opportunity for the employee to gain experience and to
establish his or her competence; and avoid the intrapersonal conflicts
which may result from a displacement-type remedy. Second, an application for preliminary relief may result in the prompt determination of
Third, the granting of preliminary rea crucial issue in the case ....
lief, both because of the reasons mentioned and the effect on the em-
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judgment. Thus, a title VII consent decree is unlike a summary
judgment motion and the decree "affects the merits" as much
as any injunction does.
The other important consideration when assessing the irreparable harm factor is whether the order would be effectively
reviewable after final judgment. Although some courts maintain that a refusal to enter a consent decree is reviewable after
final judgment,80 that assertion is easily challenged. In determiningwhether to approve a consent decree, the major consideration is whether the settlement is fair to all parties. 8 1 A trial
determination of liability renders the fairness of the proposed
settlement moot. Moreover, a proposed settlement will regularly contain a stipulation that if the settlement is not approved
by the court or is for any other reason not consummated, the
compromise and all releases thereunder shall be void.82 The
parties would thus have no legal ground to challenge the refusal to approve the consent decree. Even assuming that the
order could be reviewed upon final judgment, it is improbable
that it would be reviewed. Even courts holding that refusals to
approve proposed settlements are unappealable contend that,
as a practical matter, the propriety of the proposed settlement
will not be raised again. 83 The requirement of unreviewability
"does not require that the trial court be without power to reverse its ruling; it only requires that no further consideration
be likely."84 Finally, there are several practical limitations on
the ability of an appellate court to review, after the final judgment, the trial judge's discretionary refusal to approve settleployer's operations, will frequently enhance the employee's settlement
posture.
Id. at 40. A fourth reason, ensuring appealability in the event of the court's refusal to approve a consent decree, may now be added.
80. See Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 606 F.2d at 424-25; Roach v.
Churchman, 457 F.2d 1101, 1104 (8th Cir. 1972). Cf. United States v. American
Inst. of Real Estate Appraisers of the Nat'l Ass'n of Realtors, 590 F.2d 242, 245
(7th Cir. 1978) (holding that an order approving a consent decree is "subject to
effective review both before and after entry of final judgment") (emphasis added).
81. See Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1330 (5th Cir. 1977); Young v. Katz,
447 F.2d 431, 433 (5th Cir. 1971).
82. See Haudek, The Settlement and Dismissal of Stockholders' ActionsPartII: The Settlement, 23 Sw. L.J. 765, 783 (1969). In fact, neither the compromise nor anything said in the settlement proceedings may be invoked as admissions against interest. Id.
83. Seigal v. Merrick, 590 F.2d 35, 38 (2d Cir. 1978). See also Carson v.
American Brands, Inc., 606 F.2d at 429 (Winter, J., dissenting).
84. In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litigation, 594 F.2d
1106, 1108 (7th Cir.) (citing 15 C. WIGrr, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 10,
§ 3911, at 470), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 146 (1979).
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ments. An adjudication at the trial level eliminates the
uncertainty present at the time of a settlement and makes it
85
difficult to evaluate the fairness of the proposed settlement.
Another problem could arise if the parties reach an agreement
that is rejected by the trial judge and then tender several other
proposals that are all rejected. If the appellate court reverses
the trial judge on all the decrees 8 6-an issue arises over which
decree, if any, is to be chosen. Although the first decree should
arguably be given effect, it is far from clear whether that would
be the result. Conceivably, either all the decrees could be remanded to have the district court choose among them, or the
appellate could make the choice. If the latter is done, the appellate court would arguably be interjecting itself unnecessarfly into the trial process. It would no longer be merely
reviewing decrees, but would be affirmatively choosing the
"preferred" alternative.
The third element in ascertaining the applicability of section 1292(a) (1) is the effect of the competing policy justifications for the existence of a finality rule and for the creation of
an exception. 87 The Carson court enumerated several policy
reasons to limit review: the added judicial efficiency that can
be obtained by the avoidance of piecemeal appeals and concomitant trial delays, the increased precision of appellate review after complete development of the facts at trial, and the
enhancement of the district court's control over the litigation. 88
Many of these policy considerations are largely inapplicable to
a refusal to approve a proposed settlement. Although appellate
judicial resources will be conserved if no further appeal of the
denial of the consent decree takes place, refusals to review denials of consent decrees mean continued use of judicial resources at the district court level. 89 The savings at the district
85. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
86, The dissent believed this to be the case in Carson. See 606 F.2d at 428-

29.
87. These policy reasons are similar to those used in the pragmatic Gillespie balancing test. See note 16 supra. Although the Gillespie test no longer
has vitality as an independent exception to be applied in individual cases, the
policy considerations of Gillespie could still be applied, not to a particular case,
but to a general type of order. See Boston Note, supra note 10, at 72 n.65.
88. 606 F.2d at 424-25. See also note 12 supra. This rationale is inapplicable, because the harassing party must first agree to a complete settlement, with
a strong probability that it will be approved, before instigating the "harassing"
appeal of the denial.
89. In addition, further litigation may eventually waste appellate resources
by generating additional appealable issues that would have been avoided if the
earlier settlement had resulted in a consent decree. See note 15 supra and accompanying text. See also Boston Note, supra note 10, at 75.
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court level may well offset the costs at the appeals level. An
additional reason to delay review-the likelihood that a more
well-developed record will be available for review by an appellate court after a trial-is irrelevant here because appellate review of the judge's discretionary denial must be based on the
probable outcome of the litigation at the time of settlement,
and an actual trial outcome only distorts a retroactive assessment of the circumstances as they appeared at that time. 90 The
Carson court was correct in pointing out that denial of appeal
would enhance the trial court's control over the litigation, 9 1 but
the argument that such control is desirable assumes the availability of effective review to correct any trial court abuses. It has
already been demonstrated that effective review will be unavailable.92 The Fourth Circuit, in Flinn v. FMC Corp.,9 3 has
established careful standards for approval of title VII settlements. 94 Despite the Carson majority's belief that the Flinn
standards should have been followed,9 5 the Carson finding of
unappealability means that the use of these standards will be
effectively reviewable only when the lower court approves the
proposed settlement.
Supplementing these policy reasons favoring appealability
is the general policy of encouraging settlements. 96 Class action
97
settlements should be encouraged to an even greater extent,
and the legislative history of title VII indicates that proposed title VII consent decrees should be accorded the greatest deference. 98 According to the Supreme Court, "[c]ooperation and
90. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
91. See 606 F.2d at 423.
92. See notes 80-85 supra and accompanying text.
93. 528 F.2d 1169, 1172-74 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976).
94. 528 F.2d at 1172-74.
95. See 606 F.2d at 422.
96. Settlements are generally favored. See Prandini v. National Tea Co.,
557 F.2d 1015, 1021 (3d Cir. 1977); Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 541 F-2d
365, 372 (3d Cir. 1976); Van Bronkhorst v. Safeco Corp., 529 F.2d 943, 950 (9th
Cir. 1976); Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 514 F.2d 767, 771
(2d Cir. 1975); Massachusetts Casualty Ins. Co. v. Forman, 469 F.2d 259, 261 (5th
Cir. 1972); Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 469
F. Supp. 836, 846 (N.D. Ill.
1979).
97. See Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1331 (5th Cir. 1977); Van Bronkhorst v. Safeco Corp., 529 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1976).
98. A court recognizing this policy stated: "It is often said that litigants
should be encouraged to determine their respective rights between themselves
.... Particularly in class action suits, there is an overriding public interest in
favor of settlement .... In a Title VII case, as here, the policy favoring settlement is even stronger in view of the emphasis placed upon voluntary conciliation by the Act itself." Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1330-31 (5th Cir. 1977).
See generally Note, supra note 64, at 517-18. See also Rodgers v. United States
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voluntary compliance were selected as the preferred means for
achieving [the goals of title VII]."99 Clearly, "[1]itigation was
to be the last resort."100 This policy is a strong argument in
favor of immediate appealability when a trial court has disapproved consent decrees that would eliminate the need for a
trial.
On balance, the Carson decision that refusals to approve
proposed title VII consent decrees are not appealable appears
ill considered. The majority's recognition of the injunctive nature of the requested relief'0 1 juxtaposed with the court's conclusion that section 1292(a) (1) is inapplicable is perhaps the
most inexplicable aspect of the opinion. The court, in considering whether the denial of the consent decree was appealable
under section 1292(a) (1), failed to understand the unique characteristics of title VII consent decrees. The prospective relief
inherent in title VII consent decrees not only has the substantial effect of an injunction but also results in the requisite irreparable harm. Irreparable harm results because of the delay in
obtaining relief and because the order is effectively unreviewable after final judgment. Furthermore, the usual policy supporting finality-judicial efficiency-is much less persuasive in
the unique context of title VII consent decrees. The Carson
court also failed to give proper weight to the strong legislative
policy favoring title VII settlements. In the future, therefore,
courts should recognize the unique nature of title VII consent
decrees and allow appeal from district court refusals to approve
title VII consent decrees.

Steel Corp., 541 F.2d 365, 372 (3d Cir. 1976); Van Bronkhorst v. Safeco Corp., 529
F.2d 943, 950 n.11 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus.,
Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 846 (5th Cir. 1975); Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Delivers'
Union, 514 F.2d 767, 771 (2d Cir. 1975).
99. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974).
100. Note, Jurisdictionof the Federal Courts Under Title VII to Issue Interim
Injunctive Relief, 13 GONZ. L_REv. 995, 1008 (1978).
101. See 606 F.2d at 423 ("Here, injunctive relief was not finally denied; it
was merely not granted at this stage in the proceedings."); id. at 425 ('The district court [decided] to send the parties to trial, in lieu of granting immediate
"). See also id. at 429 n.1 (Winter, J., dissenting).
injunctive relief ....

